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Abstract 
For more than a decade scholars mostly from economy and development studies 
have described the rise of a newly emerging ‘middle class’ in the Global South in-
cluding Africa. This has led to a ‘middle class narrative’ with the ‘middle class’ as 
the backbone of economic and democratic development. Especially with regard to 
the stability of the position of the people in the ‘middle’, empirical social science 
studies challenge the ‘middle class narrative’ and at their uncertainty and insecurity. 
This tension between upward mobility at the one hand uncertainty and instability 
at the other hand (the vulnerability-security nexus) and the options to cope with this 
challenge under the condition of limited provision of formal social security is the 
focus of this case study on Kenya. Instead of an analysis of inequality based on 
income, it is more helpful to start from the welfare mix and the role of social net-
works as main elements of provision of social security. Against this background, we 
identify different strategies of coping that go together with different sets of values 
and lifestyles, conceptualised as milieus, that are not determined by the socio-
economic situation. 
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For a long time, the ‘middle class’ represented the socio-economic backbone of the Western 
model of economy and society. However, the works of Piketty ‘Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century’ (2014), Therborn ‘The Killing Fields of Inequality’ (2013) or Stiglitz ‘The Great Di-
vide’ (2016) point to rising inequality all over the world and their general observation coin-
cides with the assumption of the erosion of the ‘middle class’. Even though there are differ-
ences between North America and the different European countries, the general assumption is 
that the ‘middle class’ is under pressure (e.g. Vaughan-Whitehead 2016). But if we look at the 
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Global South, we observe the opposite. For more than a decade, scholars, mostly from eco-
nomics and development studies, have described the rise of a newly emerging ‘middle class’ 
and a slow but visible decrease in the number of people living in poverty (Banerjee/Duflo 
2008; Birdsall/Graham/Pettinato 2000; Heiman/Freeman/Liechty 2012; Kharas 2010; Mila-
novic/Yitzhaki 2002; Ravallion 2010). This observation nurtures the idea that the rise of the 
‘middle class’ is an indication of the success of economic development and the underlying, or 
corresponding, development policy. This has led to a ‘middle class narrative’ (Neubert 2016; 
Neubert/Stoll 2018). In this narrative, the ‘middle class’ is presented as the backbone of eco-
nomic development (Easterly 2001), as the advocate of a “just and sustainable economy” 
(Wiemann 2015b), or as being “good for good governance” (Birdsall 2015; see also Wiemann 
2015a). This follows the classic notion of the ‘middle class’ as a carrier of democracy (Lipset 
1959; Moore 1967).2 It not only underlines high expectations, but also includes the assump-
tion that there is a real ‘middle class’ that is homogeneous and stable (‘the’ middle class).  
At least in respect of Africa, the idea of a rising ‘middle class’ as promoted by economists 
has been under scrutiny in the social sciences. In particular, critics express doubt that people 
who have just escaped poverty constitute a real ‘middle class’. Some critics also doubt that the 
conventional class concept helps us to understand the social-economic and socio-cultural dif-
ferentiation of this growing ‘middle’ in society. They call for new analytical approaches, 
whether with or without the concept of class (e.g. Darbon 2014; 2018; Melber 2017; Neubert 
2019). Against the background of the conceptional problems, definitions of this growing 
group in the ‘middle’ of society are often very cautious and refer to ‘inbetweenness’ (Fichtmül-
ler 2016; Lentz 2016: 43; Nallet 2014: 77; Phadi/Ceruti 2013), a situation in which people are 
neither rich nor poor (Darbon 2014: 14; Kroeker/O'Kane/Scharrer 2018: 9), without any clear 
class position. The ‘middle class’ in Africa, including empirical findings on socio-economic 
situation and conduct of life, has been intensively debated in several edited volumes (Daniel et 
al. 2016; Darbon/Toulabor 2014; Kroeker/O'Kane/Scharrer 2018; Melber 2016). A very useful 
short summary of the debate has been provided by Roger Southall (2018).  
The question whether this growing group in the ‘middle’ of society in Africa is a class in 
the strict sociological understanding of the term or not is not the topic of this article. The fo-
cus here is on the stability or instability of the socio-economic situation of this rising group 
labelled as ‘middle class’. Therefore, I prefer the more neutral and descriptive term ‘middle-
income group’ for my analysis. This connects to the socio-economic data that triggered the 
current debate on the ‘middle-class’. The definition of this ‘middle class’ centres around per 
capita income per day. Depending on the authors, the lower threshold is set between 2 and 10 
US$ per capita and day calculated according to purchasing power parity (PPP).3 For Africa a 
report of the African Development Bank is the most influential source (AfDB 2011). The 
AfDB defines the middle-income group as those with an income between 2 and 20 US$, and 
refers to the group with 2 to 4 US$ per capita and day as the unstable ‘floating class’. The 
growth of the middle-income group results from upward mobility out of poverty beyond the 
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statistical poverty line of 2 US$ per capita and day. The AfDB report makes a difference be-
tween the ‘middle class’ in general (including the ‘floating class’) and a more nuanced presen-
tation in its tables, where it differentiates between the ‘floating class’, on the one hand, and 
those who cross the 4 US$ line into the ‘lower middle class’ and ‘upper middle class’, on the 
other hand. This implies that the latter have reached a fairly stable position. At the same time, 
this ‘middle class narrative’ implies a certain homogeneity of conditions of life and attitudes 
(implied by the term class). Especially with regard to the stability of people’s position, empiri-
cal social science studies challenge the ‘middle class narrative’ and point to the uncertainty 
and insecurity of the middle-income group.4 This uncertainty and instability of the middle-
income group and the options to cope with this challenge are the focus of this article.  
The analysis is based on an empirical study carried out in Kenya. Thus, it starts with some 
background information on the middle-income group in Kenya and on the empirical study. 
The majority of members of the middle-income group lives in uncertainty. The second part of 
the paper is a discussion of the consequences of this lack of stability. They work hard to keep 
their position. We will see that sustaining one’s social status is closely linked to the particular 
welfare-mix (on this term, see Esping-Andersen 1990; Evers 1990). According to their wel-
fare-mix, people have different opportunities to cope with uncertainty. This leads to the third 
part of the paper. Against this background, we need to analyse social inequality not just via 
income or ‘class’ but also with regard to the welfare-mix. However, how the options of the 
welfare-mix are used depends on the values and decisions of the middle-income earners. Fi-
nally, I ask whether these findings also apply to other African countries, and, in the light of the 
analysis, I compare the challenges facing the European middle-income group with the situa-
tion in Kenya, showing that there are some basic similarities but also clear differences. 
The Middle-Income Group in Kenya 
Kenya is one of the countries where, according to the data of the African Development Bank, 
we find a middle-income group of a considerable size. Thus, it is an interesting case for a 
deeper look. If we include the so-called ‘floating class’ (the group from two to four dollars), 
Kenya has one of the largest non-poor groups in Africa south of the Sahara, representing 
44.9% of the whole population (AfDB 2011: 5). In only five countries (Gabon, Botswana, Na-
mibia, Ghana, Cap Verde) is this percentage larger, while even in South Africa it is slightly 
lower, with 41.1%. Despite partly diverging data on the size of the middle-income group,5 the 
existence of this group in Kenya dates back to colonial times. At the time of colonisation, most 
Kenyan pre-colonial societies were acephalous societies with limited stratification, ruled by 
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the ‘old men’ (e.g. Kenyatta 1953; Ocholla-Ayayo 1976). Only a few coastal towns had strati-
fied societies. With the introduction of a modern state administration and the advance of cap-
italism, Kenyan society underwent a process of social differentiation. Some people started as 
blue-collar workers (working, for instance, in the harbour). Especially the small group of edu-
cated people experienced upward social mobility. They took lower and middle ranks in the 
administration. In the beginning, primary education was sufficient, but later secondary educa-
tion was needed. A few Kenyans with university degrees took higher positions. Those in mid-
dle and higher positions were described as the ‘African elite’, although they were in fact part of 
a middle-income group.6 The size of this group grew, especially after the Second World War 
and after independence. It started with 10.1% of the population in 1950 and increased to 
19.2% in 1970 (Berg-Schlosser 1979: 321).7 During this process, a typical pattern of economic 
activity developed. Urban income was invested in the home farm and was a main factor for 
the development of commercial agriculture. Sometimes additional land was acquired. This 
was possible because in the 1950s a process of land registration started with an option for in-
dividual ownership. In addition, wage income was also invested in trade. Successful small en-
trepreneurs used surplus income again for investment in agriculture. This led to an combina-
tion of income from different sources (Kitching 1980; Kongstad/Mönsted 1980). Thus, the 
members of this middle-income group were at the same time peasants, white-collar workers, 
small entrepreneurs, and sometimes also blue-collar workers in the formal sector. All were 
closely linked with their rural homes. A more recent study by Githinji (2000) confirms this 
pattern of combined sources of income still for present based on data for rural households. He 
states that 44% of rural households combine farm production and off-farm income. The ma-
jority of households have members who perform off-farm wage labour, while a small number 
employ labour. The rest involves a combination of off-farm business and family farm without 
employees.8 However, it is remarkable that the question of the combination of sources of in-
come has not been statistically researched. Most statistics draw a clear line between urban and 
rural households, despite the observation that many families combine rural and urban in-
come. In addition to the combination of income there are links inside the extended family 
between urban and rural areas. Better-off family members, usually in town, send regular re-
mittances to poorer family members in rural areas. This underlines the frequent socio-
economic heterogeneity of extended families (Ferraro 1971: 119-124; Githinji 2000: 53-56; 
Kroeker 2018: 281). Interestingly, the combination of sources of income was an important 
topic in a general development discussion that took place in Germany in the 1990s in respect 
of the so-called ‘Bielefeld approach’ (Elwert/Evers/Wilkens 1983). However, the focus was on 
the poor. Despite the evidence that the concept of combining income sources is a general fea-
ture of societies in Africa south of the Sahara, it is still widely ignored.  
With accelerated economic growth, especially after the political changes at the end of the 
Moi era in 2002, the middle-income group rose to approximately 45% of the population.9 The 
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following table shows a calculation of the monthly income in real US$ of a family of six in the 
middle-income group.  
 
 
Table 1: Overview of thresholds for different income groups  
according to the AfDB classification on the example of Kenya10 
 
 Lower threshold 
for one person 
Upper threshold 
for one person 
Upper threshold  
for one person 
Upper threshold 
for a family 
 PPP US$ 
per head/day 
PPP US$ 
per head/day 
Real US$ 
per head/day 
Real US$ 
per six heads/month 
Poor - 2.00 1.56 281.00 
floating class 2.01 4.00 3.12 562.00 
lower middle class  4.01 10.00 7.80 1404.00 
upper middle class 10.01 20.00 15.60 2808.00 
upper class 20.01 - - - 
 
Table 1 shows the wide range of income for the middle-income group labelled as ‘middle 
class’. Studies on the middle-income group that include also OECD countries for the analysis 
use different thresholds, e.g. between 10 and 100 US $ (per head/day) (Kharas 2010, 12). This 
shows that with regard to Africa the AfDB uses much lower thresholds. In the case of Kenya, 
we include for our analysis also a large number of people above the twenty-dollar threshold in 
the middle-income group. As I will argue below, due to the insecurity and volatility that many 
people above the twenty-dollar threshold experience, they do not belong to the more stable 
group but to a much smaller top income-group. This underlines the above-mentioned critique 
in the social science debate on the term ‘middle class’ and the somewhat arbitrary choice of 
thresholds (see for example Darbon 2014; 2018; Melber 2017). In general, we should be careful 
not to put too much emphasis on income data alone. Income data helps as an illustration, but, 
as we will see, income does not describe the real socio-economic situation. Thus, lower and 
higher middle-income positions are just approximate terms. 
The middle-income group in Kenya was the focus of a research project in Bayreuth (Ger-
many) which provided empirical data for the following sections of this article. As part of the 
larger project ‘Future Africa – visions in time’ at the University of Bayreuth (2012-2018), 
funded by the German Ministry of Education and Science, a sub-project ‘Middle class on the 
rise’ was carried out.11 Its aim was to investigate the social, economic and political contexts 
                                                     
10 Table based on data published by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2011: 20) and own calculation. Due to differ-
ent conversions it offers an informed approximation to illustrate the income levels in real US $ according to exchange rates in 
2005. Conversion to equivalent real US dollar calculated based on PPP conversion data for 2005 (www.povcal.net, accessed 
7.8.2015). 
11 For a description of the ‘Future Africa’ project see: http://www.bayreuth-academy.uni-bayreuth.de/en/gesamtprojekt/, 
accessed 28.05.2019. We are grateful for the funding we received from the German Ministry of Education and Science for our 
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and characteristics that shape this middle-income group. Topics with regard to Kenya were 
socio-cultural differentiation, social mobility and (in)security, and strategies of small-scale 
entrepreneurs. The ‘Middle class on the rise’ sub-project was carried out by an anthropologi-
cal research team comprising Erdmute Alber (project leader), Lena Kroeker and Maike Voigt, 
and a sociological team comprising Dieter Neubert (project leader) and Florian Stoll. Both 
teams conducted qualitative field research with long-term stays in the field based mainly on 
interviews, and participant observation. The empirical data given here for Kenya stems from 
this project and the ideas presented here are the result of close co-operation with Florian 
Stoll12 and intensive discussion with the other project members. A first result of this study was 
that the combination of sources of income identified in older studies still applies to the Ken-
yan households of the middle-income group. Especially the work of Kroeker and biographical 
information collected by Stoll and Voigt underline the uncertainty of the socio-economic po-
sition of many middle-income earners which constitutes the background for this article 
(Kroeker 2018; Voigt 2018). A large part of the interviewed middle-income group had moved 
up from poverty or from lower socio-economic positions.13 At the same time, they often re-
ported that they had experienced downward mobility as a result of shocks (such as unem-
ployment, sickness and health-care costs, death of a breadwinner, business failure, etc.). Some 
even fell back into poverty. Even when they remained in a lower middle-income position, they 
were always aware of the risk of (further) downward mobility, but also of opportunities to 
climb further up the social ladder (Kroeker 2016). Thus, our research provides evidence that 
the need for means to cope with risk and uncertainty is a main feature of the middle-income 
group in Kenya (Kroeker 2018; Neubert 2017). 
Means of Coping with Risk and Uncertainty 
The uncertainty of the middle-income group is often overlooked. The combination of income 
sources is a typical strategy to deal with volatile social positions. At the same time, ‘middle 
class’ as an ‘aspirational category’ (Spronk 2018: 333) shows that dealing with uncertainty is 
important for improving one’s position, with risk-taking as a way of attaining upward mobili-
ty. This attitude is usually associated with middle-income earners, but it also applies to those 
                                                                                                                                                                     
project, and for additional grants by the Volkswagen Foundation that allowed us to make an in-depth analysis of our data: a 
post-doc grant for Florian Stoll for a one-year stay at Yale University and a one-year ‘opus magnum’ grant for Dieter Neubert. 
12 During his field research, Florian Stoll conducted more than 100 interviews, which constitute the background for this 
analysis, together with the findings of Lena Kroeker and Maike Voigt. The qualitative and ethnographic approach follows 
Hartmann’s recommendation (2012, 83) that research on lifestyles and conduct of life needs a reliable database. We found 
our first interviewees in the everyday settings of the middle-income group (shopping malls, enterprises with white-collar 
workers, leisure events, etc.), and also in more open settings such as church communities and neighbourhoods. Further sam-
pling followed the principles of saturation and contrasting. This included a wide range of socio-economic positions. Despite 
the limitations of income measurement, our sample covered the whole range from people close to poverty (2 US$ per capita 
and day) to people with high incomes (> 20 US$ per capita and day). And, as we will see, it also covered different lifestyles 
and milieus. This was facilitated by a long familiarity with Kenya and long periods of field work. For an overview of the pro-
ject, see Kroeker/Voigt (2017). I will refer to other published results later in the article. 
13 Due to the qualitative nature of our data, these statements reflect trends not precise figures. In the case of upward mo-
bility, our findings correspond to the economic debate. 
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qualified as poor. Otherwise, the growth of the middle-income group that triggered the ‘mid-
dle class debate’ would not have happened.14 This moderate upward mobility and overcoming 
the two-dollar-a-day threshold is the reason why the ‘growth’ of the number of middle-
income earners is mainly a growth of the so-called floating class (two to four dollars a day). 
Despite these findings, in the policy debate, instability and uncertainty (often addressed as 
vulnerability) is still linked with the poor, or with less successful middle-income earners. But 
we need to consider it as a much wider phenomenon in African societies, with a manifest in-
fluence on social positioning and social structures. At the same time, coping with vulnerability 
and aspiring to upward mobility are crucial elements of individual social positioning, resulting 
from agency under the given structural conditions. Uncertainty results from the risk of being 
hit by typical shocks, such as unemployment, long-term sickness (cost of medical treatment, 
loss of income), old age, failure of business or farming risks. 
The means of coping are formal sector social security programmes, investment and assets, 
and semi-formal and informal solidarity networks. In Kenya there are formal social security 
programmes, especially for people employed in the formal sector. As in other countries, a core 
element of these formal schemes is provision for old age through pension schemes. In Kenya, 
the pension system for the formal sector is well developed. The employee and the employer 
each contribute 6% of the salary. Retirement age is 60. For the pension, “the insured has three 
options: purchase a life annuity from a registered insurer, take a partial lump sum and pur-
chase an annuity with the balance, or take a portion of the accounts as a lump sum” (SSA - 
The United States Social Security Administration 2015: 121). People who are self-employed 
may join the scheme, but they only have the option of a lump sum payment (SSA 2015: 121).15 
Government officers may receive up to 75% of their salary after a long period of service 
(Künzler 2016). Disability and early retirement pensions, or pensions for widows and under-
aged children, are part of the pension. However, the payments are usually much lower than 
the possible top rates. For an assessment of these pension schemes, we need to consider the 
often unstable employment situation. Even well-educated people may move between different 
jobs, with periods of unemployment or self-employment, and salaries may go up and down. 
For this reason, people are often happy to have the minimum membership that qualifies for 
the basic pension, often with just 20 or 30% of their average salary. In addition, the pension is 
only based on the salary, and not on additional payments, such as a housing allowance, (and 
other subsidies paid by the employer), which may form a considerable part of a person’s 
earned income. Finally, the pension schemes cover only about 10% of the population of Kenya 
(Dau 2003: 30-31). This means that not even all members of the middle-income group have 
access to a pension scheme. Unemployment, a typical risk for employees, is not covered by 
any formal benefit system. 
                                                     
14 Economic growth facilitates individual upward mobility. However, we should be aware of the fact that even when the 
overall number of people with middle-income increases there are also people who experience downward mobility. A growing 
middle-income group describes a positive balance of upward and downward mobility.  
15 A simplified calculation with reference to the year 2009 may help to assess the amount of the pension: with a compara-
tively high salary of 500 US$ over 30 years, the payment will be more than 20,000 US$. However, with a life expectancy of 70, 
the pension would be about 170 US$ a month. 
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Other serious risks are sickness and maternity care. Formally, all employed persons earn-
ing more than 1000 Kenyan shillings (KSh) a month,16 including government employees and 
self-employed persons, have to be members of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). 
The insurance includes the employed person and the dependents of that person. People with a 
lower monthly income may contribute voluntarily. The minimum contribution is 150 KSh per 
month and rises to 1700 KSh for those earning more than 100,000 KSh per month. The NHIF 
has about three million members, including the voluntarily insured (Künzler 2016: 70-74). In 
view of a population of more than 50 million, , because of the low rate of formal employment 
the coverage is limited, even if we assume that each insured member of the NHIF has four 
dependents. The national hospital insurance card guarantees access to free basic medical 
treatment, including hospital treatment for certain illnesses such as tuberculosis, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and AIDS (SSA 2015: 122f). Those who are able to invest more in their 
health subscribe to private health insurance schemes, which cover treatment in private health 
facilities and more than the basic medical interventions. All these health insurance schemes 
cover or subsidise only the costs of medical treatment but does not compensate salary or in 
case of self-employed income losses. The Employment Act regulates sick leave. After two 
months of employment, the employer has to pay 100% of the earnings for two weeks during 
sick leave. Some trade union agreements extend this period to between one and six months, 
and sometimes for an additional period with 50% of the earnings. Maternity leave with full 
pay is granted by employers for three months (SSA 2015: 122). However, except in the case of 
special trade union agreements, long periods of serious sickness are a great challenge to secu-
rity, not only for the self-employed but also for employees, even when the cost of medical 
treatment is covered. 
As a kind of safety net for the poor and groups with special needs (such as orphans, vul-
nerable children, people over 65 living in extreme poverty, poor people with disabilities), there 
are cash transfer programmes. They offer 2000 KSh per month and thus reach people living at 
the poverty line. They do not cover the whole of Kenya, but are often directed at special re-
gions with a large number of poor people. In regions with food shortage, a hunger safety net 
programme (HSNP) exists. In addition, there are various emergency aid activities in cases of 
serious food shortages (Künzler 2016: 79f). Thus, there is a certain degree of classical social 
security provision, which might cushion some shocks, but it not does not provide sufficient 
social security to keep their socio-economic position, even for the formally employed. The 
beneficiaries still face a considerable loss of income that often goes together with downward 
social mobility. 
We need to remember that the middle-income group usually combines different sources 
of income, and that social security payments are based on a salary in the formal sector, and 
sometimes on voluntary contributions to an additional private health insurance scheme. What 
is not covered in all cases is loss of income during long periods of sickness, or the death of the 
breadwinner. In addition, typical entrepreneurial risks are not covered, such as business fail-
ure or farming risks (pests, plant diseases or volatile prices). 
                                                     
16 US$1.00 = 90.65 KSh (Social Security Administration 2015: 121). 
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A very important household strategy for security provision is the diversification of risks. 
As already underlined, the combination of different sources of income not only creates a 
higher total income, but also has the effect that problems with one source of income can be 
compensated, or at least cushioned, by other sources. An unemployed person may still have 
income from a business and/or commercial farming. A regular salary may cushion financial 
problems in the (small) enterprise or on the farm. Especially investments in agriculture and 
livestock are seen as a security net that offers a means of subsistence and additional income 
even in times of crisis. Investment in agriculture is also seen as an important means of old-age 
provision. This is often combined with investment in a rural home. In one’s old age, one can 
live in the village without paying rent, and benefit from an agricultural income and the lower 
costs of living in a rural area. For those with the financial means, investment in urban housing 
(a flat or a house) is also an option, either to save rent or to gain an additional income by rent-
ing out the additional flat or house. Investing in a business can also be used as a means of old-
age provision. Such investments are assets that offer a certain security and generate additional 
income. However, they are also bound up with different kinds of risks. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that semi-formal and informal networks are 
extremely important when it comes to coping with shocks (Kroeker 2016, 2018). These struc-
tures have been addressed as ‘traditional solidarity’ (Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988), or ‘infor-
mal social security’ (Benda-Beckmann/Gsänger/Midgley 1997). Although the organisational 
patterns of ‘solidarity’ are constantly developing, the basic elements remain the same (for 
Kenya, see Neubert 1990). The core element is reciprocity in family and kinship networks. In 
the absence of a reliable old-age security scheme, the children have the responsibility of caring 
for their old parents. In cases of sickness and unemployment, the family or the extended fami-
ly are approached for financial help. Typically, these are costs for health treatment, school fees 
or school uniforms for the children. Even though primary education is free, many middle-
income class families prefer to send their children to better quality private schools. Well-off 
members of the kinship network often help to pay for the children of their siblings and other 
more or less close relatives. Members of the middle-income group who received support for 
their own education, and who have been economically successful, often feel obliged to give 
something back to the family. This can also be a way of gaining social prestige and a better 
social status. At the same time, these people can expect support from other members of the 
extended family if they suffer from shocks. This responsibility towards the family can also be 
extended to the local community. Successful community members may support other com-
munity members, or donate money for community activities or projects. People living in the 
same neighbourhood may found a network. Givers in these networks can achieve the role of a 
‘big man’ or ‘respected big woman’. This can lead to patron-client relationships where the 
giver offers financial support and expects political support and loyalty in exchange. These re-
lationships may reach beyond family or community bonds. In other cases, the church com-
munity may support its young members with a scholarship for secondary education or even 
for a university degree. This also results in an obligation ‘to give something back to communi-
ty’, as it is often put by successful members of the middle-income group in our interviews. 
These networks are based on the assumption of generalised reciprocity (Sahlins 1965: 193-
194). This means that help is given in accordance with people’s needs, with the knowledge 
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that the givers can expect to receive support should they be in need themselves. However, 
where the givers succeed in maintaining their status, this potential reciprocity will not be real-
ised. Due to the inhomogeneity of families, these networks cut across different socio-
economic positions. 
There are also semi-formal networks, such as rotating savings groups, which create a kind 
of obligation. These groups may be formed in a common housing area, or by employees of the 
same company, or may be based on the same occupation. Some savings organisations take the 
form of Savings and Credit Co-operatives (SACCOs), mainly based on occupational back-
ground (Kroeker 2018: 285). They may even offer a kind of pension scheme. A very special 
form of organisation is burial societies that help their members to manage the often very high 
costs of burials. Church communities may also support their poorer members (Niechoj 
2016).17 Pentecostal churches play a special role with regard to these networks (Kroeker 2018: 
285f). They expect their members to reduce or even cut off their kinship relations and to prac-
tise solidarity within the church community instead. The Pentecostal church communities are 
usually fairly homogeneous in socio-economic terms, and thus offer middle-income members 
a network of equals. Against this background we need to assume that nearly all Kenyans, the 
middle-income earners and the poor, rely on semi-formal and informal security networks, 
together, if possible, with investment in real estate, agriculture, livestock or a business enter-
prise.  
In the understanding of Amartya Sen, formal, semi-formal and informal security struc-
tures are entitlements. With respect to coping with famine, he defines ‘entitlement’ as “the 
ability of people to command food through the legal means available in the society, including 
the use of production possibilities, trade opportunities, entitlements vis-à-vis the state, and 
other methods of acquiring food” (Sen 1981: 54). For Sen, entitlements are “not ‘rights’ in the 
normative sense…They represent actual possibilities” (Sen 1977: 34). Transferred to the in-
formal and semi-formal security networks that we have discussed, the first point is that enti-
tlement to support applies only in a case of need or an emergency. There is a moral entitle-
ment, but the potential giver still has the power to decide whether to help or not, and in what 
way. By contrast, formal security schemes are stronger, and the right to benefits can be assert-
ed in court. Some entitlements may be reflected in data on household spending, such as regu-
lar pension payments, remittances by kin, or regular remittances to kin. The majority of enti-
tlements are not visible as regular income or as regular payments, because they are payments 
that are made only in times of need. Yet these entitlements make a clear difference. A strong 
informal network can be a protection against downward social mobility, while a weak network 
can lead to great hardship when minor problems occur, such as a need for surgery or a short 
phase of unemployment. 
At the same time, these semi-formal and informal security networks can be a heavy bur-
den, especially for better-off network members. In large extended family networks, or any 
other inhomogeneous social networks, there will always be poorer members who are unable to 
cover their basic needs or to pay the school fees for their children. This never-ending obliga-
                                                     
17 This is not new, as a study of African independent churches just after independence shows; it has the striking title ‘A 
place to feel at home’ (Welbourn/Ogot 1966). 
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tion to support the poorer network members can become a serious strain for the better-off 
members. They are under constant pressure to give. 
Socio-economic positioning of households depends on strategic decisions in respect of 
managing income generation, making economic investments, paying for the children’s educa-
tion, and meeting obligations towards members of the family network. The handy formula of 
‘security maximisation’ (Elwert/Evers/Wilkens 1983) might work for the very poor, without 
overdoing the rationality argument (Neubert 1986). However, for the better-off, there is room 
for manoeuvre. Providing for the future by investing in education, a business enterprise, real 
estate, agriculture or individual security provision is important for the large majority of Afri-
cans. People in Africa need to strategise between acquiring entitlements of different kinds and 
handling obligations to provide for security.18 This interplay between vulnerability and strate-
gising, the ‘vulnerability-security nexus’ (Neubert 2019) is a central feature of African societies 
and has a crucial influence on social positioning. For the middle-income group, this vulnera-
bility-security nexus is played out in a situation of rising expectations in respect of consump-
tion and living a decent and comfortable life. 
Welfare-Mix Inequality and Social Inequality 
Against the background of the vulnerability-security nexus, and individual and collective enti-
tlements, a person’s socio-economic position cannot be defined by simple income measure-
ment. Even in cases where the household members have stable salaries, or stable returns from 
a business enterprise or farm, it is not easy to calculate the available household income. One 
important reason for this is the irregular nature of entitlement transfers, and the problems of 
including them in household statistics. Nevertheless, these payments reduce the available 
household income, especially the income available for investment and/or individual provision 
for social security. The available household income depends on the balance of entitlements 
and can only be measured over long time spans. Even a year might be too short to capture the 
real entitlement balance, which defines the available income and influences people’s ability to 
safeguard their social position and their options for upward mobility. For the long-term per-
spective, the particular welfare-mix is crucial.19 This includes access to formal social security 
provision, including individual provision, such as additional health insurance or even a pen-
sion plan, assets and investments in real estate or business enterprises (including commercial 
agriculture) that offer a stable return, and investment in the children’s education, and their 
willingness to support their parents. A decisive factor is the economic strength of the net-
works, because they fundamentally influence the available options. Two simplified scenarios 
may show the resulting different opportunities and choices and strategic options (Neubert 
2017; for more details, see Neubert in print). 
The first scenario is a person who has succeeded in improving his or her social position. 
The person’s kin, friends and community members are still poor. This person is in a special 
                                                     
18 I borrow the concept of ‘strategising’ from Nici Nelson’s analysis of female households in a Nairobi squatter area 
(1977). 
19 Lena Kroeker uses the term ‘social security mix’ (2018: 284). 
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position as somebody who has successfully climbed the social ladder, and perhaps has access 
to formal social security programmes, but there will be hardly any other network members in 
this position. According to the norm of generalised reciprocity, this person is obliged to help 
the poorer members when they are in need. There are two different strategies she or he can 
adopt. 
The first strategy is to accept this responsibility and use a part of her or his income to fulfil 
the requests of the poorer members. The consequence is constant pressure on the giver. Even 
if giving support is subject to negotiation, a considerable part of the giver’s income will be 
spent on other network members. This gives the person a high status in the community and it 
may be possible to maintain a certain living standard, but capital for investment or savings 
will always be short. This restricts the possibility of investing in the education of one’s own 
children or in a social security scheme, and hinders individual accumulation. In this case, the 
networks are still the main safety net for the giver. If the giver needs help, the resources in the 
network constituted by poorer members will be limited. They may help to safeguard survival 
in cases of emergency, but no more. The consequence is that every emergency destabilises the 
social position of the former giver.  
The second strategy is to distance or even dissociate oneself from the network. The ties in 
the network are kept weak or are completely cut. The main reference group is the nuclear 
family. The consequence is social isolation and critique from members of the extended family 
and other relevant networks. Without constant requests for help from network members, the 
person’s income is available for investment in business, land or a house, a social security 
scheme, such as health insurance, the education of the children, and/or consumption and a 
better living standard. Even if their income is still limited, these people may now decide how 
to use their resources without pressure from their relatives. If everything goes well, they have a 
chance for further advancement and accumulation. However, in the case of trouble, such as 
serious sickness, unemployment, business problems, a bad harvest, or simply a burglary, then 
the situation changes. Coping with these shocks is possible if sufficient capital can be accumu-
lated, or with effective health insurance and an adequate pension scheme, but these need to be 
supplemented by a farm or a small business, and the hope that the children will do well and be 
willing to support their parents. All this is only possible if there are no serious shocks, which is 
rarely the case. If these individual provisions do not work, or are not sufficient, the lack of a 
social support network will be felt, and the person’s social position will change radically for 
the worse, even threatening their survival.  
In both strategies, the person’s social position remains instable. In the first case, support 
for the network provides a basic safety net; in the second case even this basic safety net is 
missing. This highlights the dilemma of having to choose between safeguarding survival and 
limiting further upward mobility, on the one hand, and striving for further upward mobility 
while taking the risk of falling back into poverty without a safety net, on the other hand. In 
practice, people navigate, or strategise, between these two extremes, which limits their chances 
for upward mobility.  
A second and completely different scenario is a setting where the person and the network 
members are all well off. This applies to a small number of middle-income families whose 
parents, or in some cases grandparents, have already achieved upward mobility. The siblings 
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are usually all well-educated and have good jobs. The family has assets, like land, or an im-
proved house20 in the countryside. In addition, they may have a house or flat in town, perhaps 
a small business enterprise, and some savings. This network is economically strong, and at 
least some of the network members may have access to formal social security. The network 
members can afford private education for their children, and have enough money and/or 
health insurance to cope with sickness. Thus, cases of emergency are rare. The person’s in-
come can be spent on further investment, the children’s education, and better social security. 
In cases of shock, several members of the network are able to help, which allows cost sharing 
and a reduction of the burden. This underlines that family and kinship obligations in Kenya 
are not only accepted but also held in high esteem. If the person is in need, support is availa-
ble, and even serious challenges will be mastered due to the network support. In addition, the 
network can be mobilised for support for investment, and may offer access to new business 
opportunities or better employment. Such networks offer considerable support. In these cases, 
there is no economic reason to distance oneself from the network. Cutting such ties does not 
open up new options, but limits access to the network if support is needed. People in this situ-
ation have a very good starting position to safeguard their social position, including options 
for further advancement. There may even be some rich network members who can help to 
improve one’s position further. Joining a socially homogeneous (Pentecostal) church com-
munity creates a situation similar to this scenario. Once the relation to poorer family mem-
bers is cut or restricted, the church community steps in, which limits the number of requests 
for help but also the options for support in times of need. 
The choices in each scenario involve different risks. On the basis of our qualitative data, 
we assume that only a small part of the middle-income group is in the privileged position de-
scribed in scenario two. These people may make use of their networks for investment, not 
only in order to stabilise their middle-income position, but also as a means of further upward 
mobility. The network is strong enough to cushion investment risks. However, according to 
our assessment, the large majority of middle-income earners live in a situation comparable to 
scenario one. They need to choose between risk-taking entailing the consequence of weakened 
network ties, and remaining in the network as a safety net to prevent falling back into serious 
poverty, with resulting obligations towards poorer network members.  
Thus, a person’s long-term socio-economic position is defined by the interplay between 
assets, income generated by salaried and entrepreneurial activities, accepted obligations in 
social networks, and strategies for coping with shocks, such as individual social security provi-
sion or cultivating social networks. From the perspective of the vulnerability-security-nexus, 
social inequality and stratification can be described in terms of different ‘social-economic’ 
clusters defined by networks, their assets, entitlements, obligations and income. Such clusters 
are not as clear-cut as groups defined by income or position within the labour market. For 
Kenya, we define the following clusters: 
• The ‘poor’ without sufficient assets, with very restricted entitlements, and unable to 
fulfil obligations beyond contributing to the bare survival of others. Differences are 
                                                     
20 Improved housing refers to features such as durable construction (block or bricks, concrete floor, iron or tile roofing), 
water and sanitation facilities, etc. 
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constituted by access to means of subsistence and/or access to networks with some 
resources. 
• A widely extended ‘unstable floating cluster’ with limited assets, limited entitle-
ments and extensive potential obligations, resulting in permanent insecurity and 
vulnerability, and a highly volatile social position, even for people who have an at-
tractive occupational position or a successful business. 
• A ‘stable middle-income cluster’ with some assets, sufficient entitlements and me-
dium obligations. 
• A ‘stable upper cluster’ with large assets, extended entitlements and low obliga-
tions. 
• Political and economic top elite with extremely large assets, extensive entitlements 
and minimal obligations. 
We use the term cluster, and not class or stratum, because, especially in the ‘unstable floating 
cluster’, and to a lesser extent in the ‘stable middle cluster’, we find people with extremely dif-
ferent levels of income. Successful upward mobility from poverty may lead to a very good or 
even top occupational position with income classified as upper middle-income (‘upper middle 
class’ according to the African Development Bank) or even more. But network obligations and 
lack of security provision lead to a high risk of moving down again. Thus these clusters do not 
coincide with the assumed ‘class structure’ based on income as presented by the African De-
velopment Bank (see Table 1).  
There is a potential rupture between the poor and the unstable floating cluster, on the one 
hand, and the two stable clusters and the top elite, on the other hand. The members of the 
latter clusters, who we see as a minority in Kenya, share the privileged situation that they can 
use their income to invest for the future, including investing in the education of their children 
and acquiring new assets. Under favourable economic circumstances, this may be a starting 
point for a hidden process of social closure cutting through the middle-income group.  
A ‘cluster’ does not refer to a ‘class’. Members of a cluster do not automatically share simi-
lar interests, or the same norms and values, and they do not develop a common political con-
sciousness. And members of the ‘unstable floating cluster’ may not even realise that their situ-
ation is similar in terms of security. Especially in scenario one, people can choose between 
risk-taking and security, and their choices differ, depending on their norms and values, their 
hopes and dreams, and the resulting differences in their plans for the future with regard to 
risk-taking, and in their feeling of responsibility towards their social networks.  
In our research we identified various ‘milieus’ within the clusters and cross-cutting them. 
‘Milieus’ are “subcultural units within a society which group together people with a similar 
view of life and way of life” (Flaig/Meyer/Ueltzhöffer 1993: 55, eigene Übersetzung).21 A few 
examples may illustrate such differences. In scenario one, we identified a group of typical risk-
takers, often from a poor background, who have a clear career orientation. They keep their 
network bonds weak, or cut them off, in order to have a chance for upward mobility. We label 
this ‘milieu’ as ‘social climbers’. A milieu that seems to accept even more risk is the ‘young 
professionals’ (already described by Spronk 2012). They are in a very good employment posi-
                                                     
21 My own translation. For more details, see Neubert (in print), Neubert/Stoll (2015; 2018) and Stoll (2016; 2017; 2018). 
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tion with a high salary, they minimise or cut off their network ties, and they have enough in-
come to combine investment and consumption. However, they are comparatively young, usu-
ally without children, and may change their risky behaviour when they start a family. In addi-
tion, some ‘young professionals’ originate from the ‘stable middle-income cluster’ or from the 
‘stable upper cluster’ and minimise their network relations for social reasons, yet still rely on 
them in times of need. Another strategy is found amongst members of the ‘Pentecostal 
churches’ where people try to build up a socially homogeneous network, while cutting off rela-
tions with their poorer family members, in order to reduce obligations and gain access to a 
stronger network. Whether the new religious network is as reliable as a family network will 
show up in the case of serious problems. At the other end of the spectrum of strategies in sce-
nario one, we find ‘risk avoiders’ who try to safeguard their position, consume moderately and 
keep the family networks strong. We label this ‘milieu’ as ‘stability-oriented pragmatics’. Ac-
cording to our assessment, most members of this group live under the conditions of scenario 
one. But some may have a much stronger network, as in scenario two. There are also other 
groups (‘milieus’) that are not clearly characterised by risk-taking or risk avoidance. This may 
include people for whom scenario one applies, and others for whom scenario two applies. 
They all maintain their family ties to some degree, and try to navigate between maintaining 
their networks, career advancement and (moderate) consumption. They mainly differ in their 
moral and political values. 
Our analysis of the vulnerability-security nexus offers a new perspective on social inequali-
ty in Kenya. Instead of starting with income, it is more helpful to start from the welfare mix 
and the role of social networks. The strength of the social network and its entitlements are 
crucial factors that define the two scenarios for the middle-income group. The options availa-
ble in the scenarios help to define the different clusters according to the instability or stability 
of people’s social position. These clusters do not coincide with the ‘classes’ referred to by the 
African Development Bank and other economic data. Especially instability goes far beyond 
the four-dollar threshold (given for the ‘floating class’ in the AfDB data) into higher income 
levels. People have different strategic options based either on close links with their networks 
or on cutting off ties with their networks. The different strategies go together with different 
sets of values and lifestyles. We conceptualise these as milieus that do not systematically coin-
cide with the clusters. Thus, for an analysis of social structure, we need to analyse two differ-
ent elements. First, we need to look at the socio-economic situation, reflected by the clusters; 
this was the main purpose of this paper. Second, we need to consider the socio-cultural differ-
ences briefly presented here as different milieus (for a full analysis see Neubert in print). 
Conclusions 
The first result of this analysis of the conflicting realities between upward mobility and uncer-
tainty is that the instable and uncertain situation of the majority of people in the middle-
income group can be described in terms of a vulnerability-security nexus. Thus, to assess the 
socio-economic position of the Kenyan middle-income group, we need to consider not only 
income but also the welfare mix with all entitlements, including semi-formal and informal 
networks. At the same time, the way members handle their vulnerability does not just depend 
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on their particular sources of income and their welfare mix, but also on which strategic deci-
sions they make, as described in the two scenarios. Especially members of the middle-income 
group with weak semi-formal and informal networks and limited assets need to decide how 
much risk they can take for the option of further upward mobility. Thus, there is room for 
action and decision according to individual preferences. Even an elaborated and nuanced 
analysis of people’s socio-economic situation that considers income, including a combination 
of different sources of income, assets and the welfare-mix, will not reveal their strategies for 
dealing with vulnerability. Or, with reference to a simplified Marxist idea, we may say that 
being does not determine consciousness.  
The entitlements either of kin or other social networks that mark the situation of the mid-
dle-income group also need to be considered for the large group of the poor. For them, as for 
the middle-income group, strong entitlements can cushion shocks and offer a means of sur-
vival. Greater entitlements may offer a chance for upward mobility, for example by provision 
of education or support for investment in a small business. This underlines the importance of 
understanding the vulnerability-security nexus for analysing socio-economic inequality.  
With regard to the middle-income group, the statistics show that this group has been growing 
since the 1950s. In Kenya, the upper middle-income group (10 to 20 US$ per capita/day) and 
the group of those whose income is above the 20 US$ threshold have reached a visible size, 
even though they are still a minority. The socio-economic situation of latter (entrepreneurs, 
higher-level white collar employees, professionals) allows a living standard that comes close to 
that of the “well-off” in the Global North. In addition, the size of the other middle-income 
groups (lower-middle and upper-middle) has increased. Classification according to income 
suggests that the thesis of the ‘erosion of the middle class’ in the Global North does not hold 
for Kenya. This leads to questions that need to be discussed. First, whether Kenya is an excep-
tional case, and second, what differences and commonalities exist between the Kenyan (and 
other African) middle-income groups and the middle-income group in the Global North. 
As already mentioned, Kenya is one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a compar-
atively large middle-income group. But this does not mean that the middle-income group in 
Kenya is exceptional. The typical features described for Kenya, such as a combination of dif-
ferent sources of income, overall insecurity and uncertainty, and the crucial role of semi-
formal and informal networks, apply generally to middle-income groups in other African 
countries.22 With regard to formal social security, Kenya is situated somewhere in the middle 
between countries with a fairly well developed social security system (e.g. South Africa, Mau-
ritius) and others with only very basic formal social security systems with very limited cover-
age (e.g. Central African Republic, Mali or the D.R. Congo) (SSA 2015; World Bank 2015). Of 
course, there are differences between Kenya and other countries in Africa south of the Sahara. 
In Mauritius, the majority of the population and of the middle-income groups work in the 
formal sector with a strong social security system and people often have just one source of 
                                                     
22 On the combination of sources of income in Angola, see Schubert (2016: 149f); in Benin: Alber (2016: 180f), Heilbrunn 
2014: 135); in South Africa: Heer (2018); in Tanzania: Steinwachs (2006: 75-124); in Togo: Toulabor (2014: 247-250); and 
more generally, Akinkugbe/Wohlmuth (2016), Konings/Foeken (2006). On the role of family and social networks for social 
security in Ivory Coast, see Coulibaly (2015: 139-160); in Benin and Togo: Häberlein (2018); in Tanzania: Steinwachs (2006); 
in Nigeria: Werthmann (2006); and more generally Lohnert (2007). 
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income: either formal employment, commercial agriculture or income from a small or medi-
um enterprise. Their situation is less insecure, and informal and semi-formal networks are less 
important for survival. This also holds true for the large formal sector in South Africa. At the 
same time, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in Africa south of the Sahara. For 
the poor, and even for parts of the middle-income group, insecurity is ever-present, and semi-
formal and informal networks are important as a means of survival (Duclos/Verdier-
Chouchane 2011).23  
If we compare the situation of the Kenyan middle-income groups and of similar groups in 
other parts of Africa south of the Sahara with those in the Global North, we can identify a 
number of striking commonalities. The thesis of the ‘erosion of the middle class’ in the Global 
North is based on the threat of downward mobility, and, depending on the country, a more or 
less significant shrinking of the size of the ‘middle class’. This process is highlighted by a 
growing inequality resulting from the concentration of capital in the hands of the top elite. 
This means that the position of the ‘middle class’ in the Global North is becoming worse, at 
least in relative terms. Insecurity and Inequality is also a reality in all African countries, but 
with large variations. Nevertheless, nobody doubts that in all African countries there is a rich 
and powerful top elite. The difference with regard to the Global North is that the middle-
income group – defined according to the AfDB – has been growing in most of the countries in 
Africa south of the Sahara. In the Global North, a typical response to the threat felt by the 
middle-income group is ‘preventive status work’ (präventive Statusarbeit) (Groh-
Samberg/Mau/Schimank 2014; Schimank/Mau/Groh-Samberg 2014).24 This term has been 
used to describe the fact that safeguarding one’s position needs strategic investment in social 
security, education, housing, and so on. Belonging to the middle-income group in the North 
means having to actively cope with uncertainties. This is also the case in Kenya (and other 
African countries), although the middle-income group there is situated at a much lower eco-
nomic level; yet it faces similar risks and relies on a less well developed social security and so-
cial welfare system. Navigating between maintaining networks, career advancement and 
(moderate) consumption, with the aim of creating a stable welfare mix, is nothing other than 
preventive status work. One important difference between Kenya and Germany, or other Cen-
tral European welfare states, is that the middle-income groups in Kenya have to rely on them-
selves and their networks because of the limited capacity of the formal security systems – as is 
the case in the majority of the states in Africa south of the Sahara. Thus, the options for pre-
ventive status work depend on people’s assets, their welfare mix, and especially on the eco-
nomic strength of their networks, and are not just an individual or nuclear family affair. The 
empirically identified scenarios discussed here show that the majority of middle-income earn-
ers who cannot rely on a strong economic network have to choose between a high-risk strate-
gy with possible upward mobility and greater security with no upward mobility. With favour-
able economic conditions, risk-taking may lead to success and allow people to rise into the 
middle-income group and people may improve their income as middle-income earners. How-
ever, without more developed formal social security, there will always be a large number of 
people who fail, move downward, and possibly end up in poverty. This high volatility is the 
                                                     
23 On South Africa, see also Southall (2016), Thurlow/Resnick/Ubogu (2015), Zizzamia et al. (2016). 
24 They use the term ‘Mittelschicht’ (middle strata or middle layer) and not ‘class’. 
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crucial difference between Central Europe and Africa. In Africa, there is erosion of the mid-
dle-income group and growth of the middle-income group at the same time.25  
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